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unitised exploitation of any such resources."5 
How could one fail to understand that negotiators 
would be doing a grave disservice to their countries 
if they failed to arm themselves with a sophisti- 
cated understanding of other arrangements? Oth- 
erwise, they run the risk of paying for advantages 
that should be presumptively theirs anyway. 
Pure data are not sufficient, or there would be 
no need for these volumes; the UN Office of 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, to name one 
salient repository, already publishes maritime 
boundary agreements. As Tullio Treves wrote 
when reviewing the first two volumes of Interna- 
tional Maritime Boundaries,6 the work is "much 
more" than a comprehensive collection of mari- 
time delimitation treaties: "Its strength lies also in 
its scientific elaboration of this material." And as 
Charney's introduction to volume I (p. xxx) put it, 
irrespective of whether practice contributes to the 
formation of norms, "knowledge of techniques 
used by states to solve their maritime boundary 
disputes could contribute to the resolution of the 
remaining disputes." 
The intervening years have certainly confirmed 
this supposition. Indeed, there have been many 
more agreements than judgments or awards, and 
the former constitute a far more impressive body 
of problems and solutions than may be derived 
from the vagaries of case law, where so much 
depends on forensic happenstance-lacunae or 
treasures of evidence, the personal inspirations or 
limitations of counsel, proclivities of decision 
makers, or, indeed, the rigors of pleading with 
deadlines. 
True to past practice, the first part of this vol- 
ume consists of a series of essays addressing overall 
trends in practice. After a general contribution by 
Colson, they deal with resources, navigational and 
environmental factors in delimitation (Barbara 
Kwiatkowska), islands and rocks (Victor Prescott 
and Gillian Tiggs), the legal regime of agreements 
(Don McRae and Ciss Yacouba), tripoint issues 
(Coalter Lathrop), and "technical input" in mar- 
itime delimitation (Nuno Antunes). Some of these 
build on, and may be interestingly contrasted 
with, previous contributions. Thus, while Kwiat- 
kowska updates her own subject, Prescott/Tiggs 
and Antunes revert to topics previously treated by 
others-Derek Bowett and Peter Beazley, respec- 
tively. Other contributions from earlier volumes 
have no correlates here and remain valuable: to 
take just volume I, Bernard Oxman's leadoff essay 
on political, strategic, and historical consider- 
ations; Prosper Weil's and Keith Highet's pieces 
on geographic and geophysical factors; Louis Sohn 
on baselines; and Leonard Legault and Blair Han- 
key's contribution on method, oppositeness and 
adjacency, and proportionality. 
The core of this mega-reference work is its pre- 
sentation and analysis of treaties, which goes far 
beyond compilation: individual authors are 
responsible for separate regions and, in addition to 
producing the texts, analyze them in regional 
reports. This time, Colson and Smith take respon- 
sibility for North and South America, Carl Dun- 
das for Middle America/the Caribbean, Tim 
Daniel for Africa, Ted McDorman for the Central 
Pacific/East Asia/Southeast Asia, Prescott for the 
Indian Ocean, Chris Carleton for the Red Sea/ 
Persian Gulf, Tullio Scovazzi for the Mediterra- 
nean/Black Sea, Michael Wood for Northern and 
Western Europe, Eric Franckx for the Baltic, and 
Smith and Ashley Roach for the Caspian. It is, of 
course, impossible to analyze new treaties without 
putting them in historical and geographical con- 
text-and so these authors do just that, and in a 
manner that makes this work an excellent port of 
call before steaming off to grapple with the com- 
plexities of a new problem. 
JAN PAULSSON 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
5 Eritrea v. Yemen, Second Stage, Maritime Delimi- 
nation, para. 86 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Dec. 17, 1999), 40 
ILM 983 (2001), at <http://www.pca-cpa.org>. 
6 88 AJIL 179, 179 (1994). 
Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in 
InternationalLaw. Edited by Charlotte Ku and 
Harold Jacobson. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. Pp. xxv, 440. Index. 
$90, ?65, cloth; $39.99, ?22.99, paper. 
In their edited collection Democratic Account- 
ability and the Use of Force in International Law, 
Charlotte Ku (executive director of the American 
Society of International Law when the book was 
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published) and the late Harold Jacobson advance 
the broad claim that democracy's spread in the sec- 
ond half of the twentieth century has brought the 
use of force to heel. History's inevitable forward 
march, marked in particular by the dramatic 
developments since the September 11, 2001, ter- 
rorist attacks in the United States, has been less 
than kind to this thesis. Nonetheless, the book suc- 
cessfully delivers on the more earthbound objec- 
tive of addressing the "failure [in the literature] to 
examine issues of democratic accountability when 
military forces are used under the auspices of inter- 
national institutions" (p. 4). The book fills this 
scholarly gap admirably. The editors provide a 
concise, if conceptually limited, treatment of the 
subjects "democracy" and "the use of force." The 
book also includes an invaluable mine of data. 
Most impressively, DemocraticAccountability con- 
tains an unparalleled comparative survey of the 
use-of-force regimes operating in nine countries. 
These surveys are the book's significant merits. 
They overcome the harm done to the project's 
broader thesis by recent, compelling refutations of 
the democratic triumphalism that prevailed in the 
immediate post-Cold War era. The 9/11 attacks 
and subsequent American policy have posed exis- 
tential challenges to traditional notions of the use 
of force and have eroded much of the tentative 
hold that democratic legitimacy and international 
law might have been gaining on the use of force.1 
Democratic Accountability must be credited as 
an ambitious and complex project. It operates 
along the dual axes of international law and policy, 
on the one hand, and comparative domestic law 
and policy, on the other hand. Its subject is the 
multifaceted issue of "the use of force under inter- 
national auspices." To complicate matters further, 
the book seeks to examine the democratic charac- 
ter of the use of force along both the international 
and domestic axes. This additional consideration 
introduces the confounding subject of"democra- 
cy"2 to an already difficult project. The book also 
collects, as noted above, a series of country reports 
written by accomplished commentators that con- 
centrate "on the experience of nine democracies," 
with each having "contributed military forces to 
operations conducted under the auspices of inter- 
national institutions" (p. 5). Thus, Democratic 
Accountability merges the disciplines of, inter alia, 
democratic theory, political science, comparative 
law and policy, and the international law of the use 
of force. The book can only survey such an array of 
subjects and suggest their interconnections. All 
the same, as a single-volume resource covering so 
much ground, and supported as it is with an acces- 
sible presentation of data in the tables in its appen- 
dix, Democratic Accountability is bound to form 
the starting point of more narrowly focused 
research in the future. 
In their introduction to Democratic Account- 
ability, Ku and Jacobson make a significant contri- 
bution by concisely defining and cataloging the 
various manifestations of the use of force under 
international auspices, including: monitoring and 
observation; traditional peacekeeping; peacekeep- 
ing plus state building; force to ensure compliance 
with international mandates; and enforcement. 
They give credit to a number of other studies for 
these classifications, but here they have com- 
pressed the studies into an accessible summary, an 
effort that is enriched by Edwin Smith's contribu- 
tion (pp. 81-103) to Democratic Accountability's 
introductory materials. 
Ku and Jacobson are interested in characteriz- 
ing the link between democracy and the uses of 
force as an international matter. They begin their 
study by conceding much on this point. First, the 
editors accept that "political theorists regard 
democracy as a system of governance within a 
state's territorial limits" and that "international 
problems [are] fundamentally different . . . and 
not susceptible to the same democratic processes 
and institutions of governance" (p. 4, emphasis 
' 
Considering the unilateralism with which the 
United States has prosecuted the war in, and occupation 
of, Iraq, one cannot help but look back with some sad- 
ness (and sense of loss) when reading today Ku and 
Jacobson's declaration that, when invading Afghanistan 
in 2001 after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the "US 
government paid close attention to the reactions, not 
only of its own citizens, but of a diverse global public 
opinion" (p. 3). 
2 "One of the difficulties one must face at the outset 
is that there is no democratic theory--there are only 
democratic theories." ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE 
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (1956). 
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added). This view is supported by the few com- 
mentators on democratic theory with whom Ku 
and Jacobson briefly engage in their introduction. 
Dahl, Held, and Keohane are reportedly skeptical 
of the democratic potential of the international 
order (pp. 10-11). This concession depends on a 
conventional model of democracy that, by its 
nature, is centered on the nation-state. Martin 
Nettesheim has noted a similar circularity in dis- 
cussions about the democratic deficit in the supra- 
national European Union: "This [nation-state] 
model [of democracy] serves as the standard 
against which the democratic character of the EU 
... is measured. On the basis of such an approach, 
it is easy to come to the conclusion that the EU has 
a 'deficit in democracy'."3 
But this view of democracy and the interna- 
tional order is a bit too superficial. For example, I 
read Held to be less skeptical of the prospects for 
a cosmopolitan democracy-and, thus, less 
beholden to the conventional nation-state model 
of democracy-than Ku and Jacobson suggest.4 It 
is a disappointment that the book's expansive 
agenda demands that, at least with respect to con- 
ceptualizing the theoretically charged subject of 
democracy, it relies on a narrow and conventional 
definition; in the process, it neglects much inter- 
esting work in the field that directly confronts the 
challenges posed by internationalization, cosmo- 
politanism, and globalization.5 Following this 
narrow approach to democratic theory comes at 
the expense of Ku and Jacobson's obvious interest 
in internationalizing the subject of the book. 
The second concession to the domestic, rather 
than the international, priority of their study 
comes when Ku and Jacobson note in their intro- 
duction that a literal international use of force has 
been precluded by the failure of the UN Charter's 
Article 43 regime. Instead, they are forced to con- 
sider what are essentially domestic uses of force 
pursued "under international auspices." Of 
course, even this form of military engagement has 
been relatively rare, though increasing dramati- 
cally in significance since the end of the Cold War. 
The book's neglect of two significant develop- 
ments of the last decades, in favor of its focus on 
international uses of force, further confounds the 
position that the editors stake out for the project. 
The first is the shift that occurred during the Cold 
War era toward intrastate conflicts and civil wars. 
The second is the more recent shift toward the pri- 
vatized and often asymmetrical use of force, espe- 
cially with respect to international terrorism. 
These prominent, contemporary manifestations 
of force do not fit neatly into Democratic Account- 
ability's scheme and are excluded. 
Considering their view that the international 
order is inherently undemocratic, and considering 
that the use of force primarily has remained a 
domestic matter, albeit now increasingly sanc- 
tioned by international institutions, it is surprising 
that Ku and Jacobson nonetheless marvel at the 
scholarly community's "failure to examine issues 
of democratic accountability when military forces 
are used under the auspices of international insti- 
tutions" (p. 4). With these concessions, one might 
have asked what there was to study. 
All of the above requires that the editors turn 
their attention to the democratic makeup of 
domestic law and policy regarding the use of 
force-for that, given their intellectual perspec- 
tive, proves to be a truer measure of democratic 
3 Martin Nettesheim, Developing a Theory ofDemoc- 
racyfor the European Union, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 
358, 359 (2005). 
4 It is true, as Ku and Jacobson point out (p. 11), that 
Held views the existing international infrastructure as 
inadequate to the task of promoting and sustaining 
democracy as an international matter. But he sees the 
way out. See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
GLOBAL ORDER 265-86 (1995); DAVID HELD, 
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 335-60 (2d ed. 1996); 
David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Realities and Def- 
icits, in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION 305, 317-20 
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002). 
5 Jiirgen Habermas, in particular, has forged a new 
democratic theory in response to the growing signifi- 
cance of the supranational European Union. His theory 
of discursive democracy imagines a European public 
sphere that transcends the traditional base ofdemocratic 
governance-namely, the nation state. See JORGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CON- 
TRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAWAND 
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); JURGEN 
HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: 
POLITICAL ESSAYS (Max. Pensky ed., 2001); Jiirgen 
Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, NEW 
LEFT REV., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 5, 14, 17. Habermas is 
optimistic that such features can be achieved at the 
supranational level in Europe. 
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influence on the use of force. To this end, the edi- 
tors have assembled the impressive collection of 
country reports. 
The editors' conceptualization of democracy is 
disappointing for reasons other than that it 
detracts from their clear interest in international- 
izing their subject. Democracy, Ku and Jacobson 
assert, requires only the promotion of the rule of 
law and the dependence on majority rule as a prin- 
ciple for decision making. In their introduction 
Ku and Jacobson explain that "[a]lthough some 
states had some democratic characteristics for cen- 
turies, the development of democratic govern- 
ments is a product of the twentieth century. The 
trend accelerated sharply with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 and the collapse of communism in 
the Soviet Union in 1991" (p. 7). Repeating the 
statistics that fueled the "end of history" move- 
ment at the start of the 1990s,' Ku and Jacobson 
note that in "1987, there were fewer than 70 dem- 
ocratic states; by 2000, 120 states had govern- 
ments that by broad criteria could be called dem- 
ocratic" (id., emphasis added). 
The editors' definition of democracy is ade- 
quate for the purpose of getting on with their 
project: making some kind (any kind?) of demo- 
cratic diagnosis of the use of force. However, their 
embrace of such a limited and formal definition 
suggests Susan Marks's critique of "low intensity 
democracy."7 The editors' anemic definition of 
democracy8 implicates them in the twofold mis- 
take of viewing the revolution in governance that 
followed the end of the Cold War as (1) genuinely 
democratic and (2) the final and complete ascen- 
dance of the democratic model. Marks has effec- 
tively challenged both assumptions. First, she 
argues that "low intensity democracy," of the kind 
invoked by Ku and Jacobson may not be democ- 
racy at all. It neglects a "long tradition of demo- 
cratic thought, carried forward in the second half 
of the twentieth century through such concepts as 
'participatory democracy', 'strong democracy', 
'discursive democracy', 'deliberative democracy', 
and 'communicative democracy'." Instead, "low 
intensity democracy" primarily serves as a vehicle 
for advancing and entrenching global, liberal eco- 
nomic conditions to the advantage of the wealthy 
Western nations and global capital. Second, 
Marks argues that "low intensity democracy," far 
from ushering in the stable governments meant to 
preside over the end of history, instead "builds 
... highly fragile structure [s]" that are susceptible 
to tensions resulting from unresolved political and 
economic strains.9 
I recognize that DemocraticAccountability is not 
the forum for exploring in greater depth the com- 
plexities of democratic theory and the broader 
array of models of democracy.10 But the editors fail 
to acknowledge that there have been challenges to 
6 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY 
AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
7 "'Low intensity democracy' is one of a number of 
phrases that have been coined to highlight the relative 
formality of this conception of democracy. Others 
include 'cosmetic democracy' and 'fagade democracy', as well as expressions which eschew reference to democ- 
racy altogether." SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL 
CONSTITUTIONS 53-54 (2000) (citing Barry Gills, 
Joel Rocamora, & Richard Wilson, Low Intensity 
Democracy, in LOW INTENSITY DEMOCRACY: POLIT- 
ICAL POWER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3 (Barry 
Gills, Joel Rocamora, & Richard Wilson eds., 1993), 
and WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POL- 
YARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, US INTERVENTION, AND 
HEGEMONY (1996)). 
8 "A conception of democracy tends to prevail ... in 
which certain institutions-above all, the holding of 
periodic multiparty elections and the official separation 
of public powers-are taken largely to suffice. A signally 
undemanding standard is set with regard to more far- 
reaching objectives, such as enhancing respect for 
human rights, social justice, and civilian control of the 
military." Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
9 Id. at 54-59. 
10 See generally HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 4; AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF 
DEMOCRACY (1999); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOC- 
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PER- 
FORMANCE (1996); see, e.g., HABERMAS, BETWEEN 
FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 4; HABERMAS, THE 
POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION, supra note 5; 
DEIRDRE M. CURTIN, POSTNATIONAL DEMOCRA- 
CY: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A POLIT- 
ICAL PHILOSOPHY (1997); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DIS- 
CURSIVE DEMOCRACY (1990); JOHN S. DRYZEK, 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND (2004); 
DELIBERATIVE D MOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON 
AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 
1997); L. ALI KAHN, A THEORY OF UNIVERSAL 
DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE END OF HISTORY 
(2003); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITI- 
ZENSHIP (1996). 
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democratic messianism from the start."1 At the 
very least, the editors' view fails to recognize the 
nuanced and various forms of "democracy" that 
emerged after the end of the Cold War. Signifi- 
cantly, time has now proven Marks's second cri- 
tique correct. Many of the "new democracies," 
especially in the former Soviet satellites, have 
descended into illiberal or authoritarian gover- 
nance. Elsewhere, I have raised questions about 
whether the newly independent states should have 
been placed in the democratic column in the first 
place, arguing that majority-rule plebiscites, often 
leading to the territorial exclusion of racial, ethnic, 
and religious minorities upon the creation of new 
states, represented only a perilous democratic 
birth at best.12 Considering the democratic defi- 
ciencies plaguing many "new democracies," their 
classification as such was made possible only by 
invoking "broad," forgiving criteria in the manner 
that Ku and Jacobson do in their introduction. It 
is hard to see what the editors gain from this strat- 
egy. First, they overstate the number of countries 
that resolve use-of-force issues, at least presump- 
tively, in a democratic fashion. Second, by over- 
stating the number of "democracies" in this way, 
the editors accept formal, but superficial, manifes- 
tations of democracy as proof of their thesis. 
Among the book's introductory materials, Lori 
Damrosch's contribution is remarkable for its 
optimism. She notes a historical trend toward the 
constitutionalization of the use of force, and 
within that trend she emphasizes parliamentary 
accountability via oversight, budgetary control, 
public debate, and, in some cases, formal approval. 
This notion of parliamentary accountability 
might be a better characterization of the book's 
thesis than the one provided by Ku and Jacob- 
son-who, indeed, borrow it for their introduc- 
tion: "In the closing decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury, there was a general trend 'toward 
subordinating war powers to constitutional con- 
trol,' including 'greater parliamentary control over 
the decision to introduce troops into situations of 
actual or potential hostilities"' (p. 12).13 Dam- 
rosch has been exploring this subject for more than 
a decade, and her influence on Democratic 
Accountability is clear; the narrower question of 
parliamentary accountability receives concen- 
trated attention throughout the nine country 
reports. 
The country reports are Democratic Account- 
ability's true achievement. Well-written, accessi- 
ble surveys prepared by knowledgeable commen- 
tators, the reports are an exceptional comparative 
resource. They place at hand a treatment of each 
state's constitutional law with respect to the use of 
force. And in a nod to the editors' internationaliza- 
tion thesis, the reports at least consider the "inter- 
face" between international institutions and 
domestic regimes for the use of force, with specific 
attention to the impact that the former have on the 
latter. 
The country reports, for all their utility, provide 
inconclusive support for the editors' thesis that 
there is an increasing parliamentarization of the 
use of force. Several of the reporters note such a 
trend in their respective systems, but not without 
some qualification. Fen Osler Hampson, for 
example, notes that in Canada, "[a]t the domestic 
level, in both peacekeeping and peace enforce- 
ment operations, the trend is towards more fre- 
quent consultation with parliament by the govern- 
ment on Canadian troop deployments" (p. 152). 
This parliamentary role is limited to consulta- 
tions, however, and is not mandated by the con- 
stitution. Instead, Hampson's report reveals a 
political culture in which entrenched support for 
international peacekeeping operations, coupled 
with limited parliamentary decision making in the 
field of military affairs, raises questions about the 
depth of parliamentary accountability for Cana- 
da's use of force. Knut Nustad and Henrick 
Thune, commenting on Norway, report that the 
11 ALEX CALLINICOS, THE REVENGE OF HISTORY: 
MARXISM AND THE EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS 
(1991); Alex Callinicos, Liberalism, Marxism, and 
Democracy: A Response to David Held, 22 THEORY & 
SOC'Y 283 (1993). 
12 Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in Interna- 
tional Law and the Demise ofDemocracy? 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 601 (2003). 
13 Quoting Lori Fisler Damrosch, Is There a General 
Trend in Constitutional Democracies Toward Parliamen- 
tary Control over War-and-Peace Decisions, 1996 ASIL 
PROC. 36-40. 
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Foreign Policy Committee, which comprises gov- 
ernment and parliamentary officials, "is illustra- 
tive of an important feature in Norwegian foreign 
policy-the prominent consultative role played 
by the parliament" (p. 163). But this role is not a 
sign of the Norwegian government's willingness to 
grant the parliament a role greater than that of 
consultant regarding the use of force. Military 
affairs in Norway, they explain, are a royal prerog- 
ative exercised by the government. In any event, 
Nustad and Thune have faint praise for the 
democratizing effects of the Foreign Policy 
Committee. "[T]he most striking feature of 
the Committee," they complain, "is its lack of 
transparency" (id.). Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov's 
description of the determinative role played by the 
upper house of the Russian parliament in the deci- 
sion to deploy forces internationally also cannot be 
regarded as strong evidence of a trend toward par- 
liamentarization. Tuzmukhamedov notes "that 
the Federation Council has never refused to give 
consent to a request for authorization of a foreign 
deployment" (p. 278). Georg Nolte, in his report 
on Germany, describes the most frequently 
invoked, and probably the most dramatic, exam- 
ple of a potential trend toward parliamentarizing 
the use of force. He explains that in 1994, in its 
decision in the Military Deployment case, the Ger- 
man Federal Constitutional Court "interpreted 
the Grundgesetz [Basic Law] to require every 
'armed operation' (bewaffneter Einsatz), meaning 
every use of the armed forces that entailed the pos- 
sibility of their involvement in armed clashes, to be 
approved by the Bundestag" (p. 237). This "coura- 
geous" (p. 243) democratization of the use of force 
must, nonetheless, be qualified on several points. 
First, it is a constitutional innovation with a 
unique foundation in German history and culture. 
For this reason it only cautiously should be char- 
acterized as part of a global trend. Second, many of 
the details surrounding the issue of the use of force 
complicate the Federal Constitutional Court's 
seemingly clear rule. For example, in the face of an 
emergency, the chancellor retains the authority to 
deploy forces without parliamentary approval. 
That contingency might further confound the rule 
if an emergency action is concluded before the 
Bundestagis able to vote. The "[r]ight of initiative" 
(p. 245) also remains with the chancellor; parlia- 
ment can neither order the government to use 
force nor demand the cessation of the use of force. 
Nolte concludes his report on Germany by stating 
that it "is too early to draw any firm conclusions in 
terms of democratic accountability from the legal 
structure" (p. 251) of the German Federal Consti- 
tutional Court's 1994 decision. 
The Canadian, German, Norwegian, and Rus- 
sian country reports provide only equivocal evi- 
dence of the posited trend toward the parliamen- 
tarization of the use of force, and the remaining 
country reports seem to disprove the hypothesis 
altogether. Ramesch Thakur and Dipankar Ban- 
erjee, reporting on India, note that "[w]ithin the 
generally supportive policy framework set by the 
government, the decision to participate in any spe- 
cific operation lies more with the bureaucracy than 
with the elected representatives of the people. 
Debates in parliament are rare and muted" 
(p. 189). Surprising for the apparent difference 
identified between Germany and Japan on this 
issue-despite their similar post-World War II 
histories-Akiho Shibata explains that "[a]s long 
as Japan's participation is within constitutional 
and [pre-ordained] legislative parameters, that 
decision is, in principle, within the discretion of 
the executive" (p. 219). Reflecting the strong pres- 
idential model of France's Fifth Republic, Yves 
Boyer, Serge Sur, and Olivier Fleurence explain 
that "[i]n reality, . . . the National Assembly and 
the Senate have limited control" (p. 294); "the 
question of democratic accountability in France is 
not principally one of legislative involvement" 
(p. 298). The United Kingdom's parliamentary 
tradition, although the opposite of the French 
presidential model, nonetheless similarly prefers 
the executive (in this case the prime minister) in 
use-of-force decisions. This preference is a 
by-product of the British system's minimization 
of the separation of powers, which makes the 
prime minister, supported by his or her parliamen- 
tary majority, the chief legislative figure in addi- 
tion to being the executive. Nigel White observes 
that in "the United Kingdom, one of the oldest 
democracies, [the tension between democratic 
accountability and the sovereign's use of force] is 
becoming increasingly apparent, though the 
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weight of constitutional practice still concedes 
considerable latitude to the executive in making 
such decisions" (p. 300). Finally, Michael Glen- 
non is openly skeptical of the supposed parliamen- 
tary trend with respect to the United States. "If 
anything," he argues, "the trend in the United 
States has been toward less accountability of the 
executive to the legislature, not more" (p. 344). 
It is also necessary to remark that the country 
reports suffer from an unfortunate omission that is 
mandated by the project's focus on a few demo- 
cratic countries. I accept the limits of space and 
coherence that bedevil any such comparative 
project. But the incredible utility of the nine sur- 
veys collected in Democratic Accountability pleads 
for the addition of others. Especially considering 
the present geopolitical climate, it would have 
been of great interest to know what domestic legal 
and political processes operate in the decision to 
use force in, inter alia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethi- 
opia, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, South 
Africa, and Uruguay. With the exception of Israel, 
these countries are top-twenty troop contributors 
to UN peacekeeping missions. Brazil, Israel, 
Poland, and South Africa are diverse and well-es- 
tablished democracies, presenting distinct sys- 
temic and contextual issues of certain comparative 
interest. 
There is also a compelling argument to be made 
that efforts devoted to the study of accountability 
regarding the decision to deploy soldiers are better 
focused on nondemocratic states. In such coun- 
tries, including the many African ones that con- 
tribute to the use of force under international aus- 
pices (including missions of the United Nations 
and regional organizations), the risk of illegitimate 
uses of force and their accompanying conse- 
quences for the human rights of those countries' 
citizen-soldiers is exponentially greater than in the 
democracies considered in the book; the citizens of 
those countries lack the ability to check use-of- 
force decisions via the democratic process. 
Democratic Accountability acquits itself nobly, 
most significantly by presenting the comparative 
law community with its remarkable country 
reports. I take some exception to the way that the 
editors conceptualize the constituent elements of 
their thesis and particularly would have preferred 
a more thorough and creative treatment ofdemoc- 
racy. Tragically, time has not borne out the book's 
broadest claim. Rather than seeing more demo- 
cratic and parliamentary authority over the use of 
force, the few short years since the book's publica- 
tion have been ones of marked decline. I say "trag- 
ically" because I share the conviction that use-of- 
force decisions increasingly must come to be 
legitimated by democratic processes. Certainly, it 
is not the editors' fault that history seems to have 
set back that agenda. To their credit, with Demo- 
cratic Accountability we have the impressive man- 
date as scholars and policymakers to press forward 
with the effort to achieve that goal. 
RUSSELL A. MILLER 
University ofldaho College ofLaw 
The Constitutionalization ofthe World Trade Orga- 
nization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Commu- 
nity in the International Trading System. By 
Deborah Z. Cass. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. Pp. xxvi, 266. Index. 
$115, ?60, cloth; $39.95, ?20, paper. 
Nonlawyers must surely be surprised to see how 
we lawyers get all worked up when the words "con- 
stitution" or "constitutionalization" are men- 
tioned. To use, or not to use, the C-word was at the 
heart of many legal discussions on the recently 
rejected constitution for Europe (or, more cor- 
rectly, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe). In the context of that other, global 
project of economic integration-the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)-similar debates are 
raging, albeit at an earlier stage of development.1 
As Miguel Maduro points out, in the European 
context we have moved from talking about a "pro- 
cess of constitutionalization," to questioning 
whether such a process represents a European 
"constitution" (does Europe have a constitution?), 
and then on to discussing whether Europe requires 
a formal constitution (does Europe need a consti- 
tution?).2 In the WTO, in contrast, we are, for the 
' For the most recent sample, see Symposium: WTO 
'Constitutionalism,' 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623 (2006) (with 
articles by Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman). 
2 Miguel Poiares Maduro, The Importance ofBeing 
Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the 
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